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The Labour Allocation Decisions of 
Farm Households: 
Defining a theoretical model 
Trevor Donnellan and Thia Hennessy* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 31/October 2012 
1. Introduction 
Well-functioning factor markets are a necessary condition for the competitiveness and 
growth of agriculture and for rural development. At the same time, the functioning of the 
factor markets themselves is influenced by changes in agriculture, in the rural economy and 
in EU policies. Member state regulations and institutions affecting land, labour and capital 
markets may cause important heterogeneity in the factor markets, which in turn may impact 
the functioning of factor markets and the interactions between factor markets and EU 
policies. 
The overall objective of the Factor Markets project is to analyse the functioning of factor 
markets for agriculture in the EU-27, including the candidate countries. Furthermore, the 
objective is to compare the different markets, their institutional framework and their impact 
on agricultural development and structural change, as well as their impact on rural 
economies in the member states, candidate countries and the EU as a whole.  
The objective of this deliverable is to set out a conceptual framework for the empirical 
analysis of labour markets. A theoretical model that can be used to describe farm households’ 
labour allocation decisions will be presented and this model will be used in subsequent work 
packages to empirically test the factors that are hypothesised to affect labour allocation 
decisions. 
The paper begins by presenting a brief review of previous farm household labour allocation 
studies. A theoretical model is identified from this review and the model is then described in 
more detail. The paper concludes by discussing the role of agricultural policy in labour 
allocation decisions and how such policies can be represented in the theoretical farm 
household model.  
2. Review of labour allocation studies 
Given the increased incidence of off-farm employment i.e., farmers engaged in gainful non-
farm employment, and the importance of non-farm income to farm households, the decision 
of farmers to participate in off-farm employment has been the subject of many studies and 
research papers. Lee (1965) was among the first to extend the standard labour leisure model 
to consider the special situation of farm operator households. Since then many studies of 
labour allocation by farmers and other members of farm households have been conducted. 
The empirical literature on estimating off-farm labour participation and supply covers a 
variety of issues. Huffman (1980) was the first to estimate off-farm labour supply and 
participation models for farm households. Since then, there have been many methodological 
improvements. Advances have included: the incorporation of a test for Heckman's sample 
selectivity bias and analysis with disaggregated data (Sumner, 1982); a recognition of the role 
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of the spouse's decision-making and off-farm labour participation and the joint decision-
making process between spouses (Huffman & Lange, 1989; Gould & Saupe, 1989; Lass & 
Gempesaw, 1992); the inclusion of local labour market considerations (Tokle & Huffman, 
1991; Ahearn & El-Osta, 2002; Lass & Gempesaw, 1992); the impact of government payments 
on off-farm labour supply (El-Osta & Ahearn, 1996); the impact of the decoupling of direct 
payments on labour supply (Hennessy & Rehman, 2007); and the role of farm income risk in 
explaining off-farm labour supply (Mishra & Goodwin, 1997) are some notable studies.  
A survey of the literature suggests that previous empirical studies of labour allocation 
decisions have generally focused on the characteristics of and the factors affecting off-farm 
labour supply and participation decisions. These studies identify the diverse variety of factors 
that influence the labour allocation decision. The general findings are the significant effects 
of human capital on labour demand and supply and the life-cycle effects of human capital. 
Huffman (1977 and 1980) presented evidence that investment in education and agricultural 
extension services increases farmers’ off-farm labour supply by increasing the reallocative 
ability of farmers. Other studies have supported the significant influence of local labour 
market conditions, on the probability of supplying labour off-farm, focusing on the distance 
from a metropolitan area and the local rate of unemployment, among other factors. Sumner 
(1982) showed that urbanization positively influences the participation rate because of the 
increase in off-farm job opportunities. Tokle & Huffman (1991) proved the significant effect 
of local economic conditions such as the anticipation of labour demand growth, 
unemployment rates and share of employment in services.  
The importance of farm characteristics and farm family structure in the decision to 
participate in off-farm work has also been the subject of a number of studies. Kilkenny (1993) 
and Kimihi (1994) present evidence that participation in off-farm labour markets differs 
across farm type and family structure. Several papers showed that farm system and size, that 
is type of farm enterprise, affects the labour decision for example Lass, Findeis & Hallberg 
(1989). Some studies have established the significance of the number of dependents on the 
farm income. Mishra & Goodwin (1997) have found a negative effect between the number of 
children and the number of hours worked off farm by farmers’ spouses. The effect of children 
on farmers’ time allocation is less clear. Lass, Findeis & Hallberg (1991) explain that on the 
one hand childcare may require a husband’s time, but on the other hand the presence of 
more children may generate greater pressure to obtain additional income to meet the 
consumption needs of a larger family.  
There are a number of particularly interesting studies that focus on the role of government 
subsidies in the allocation of labour. The first study conducted by Ahearn, El-Osta & Dewbre 
in 2002 involved an assessment of the effect of decoupled payments on labour allocation. 
They analysed the effect of the US FAIR Act of 1996 on farmers’ labour allocation decisions, 
six years after its establishment. The FAIR Act introduced production flexibility contract 
payments that were designed to be decoupled from production. Ahearn et al explored the 
impact of decoupled payments on labour allocation with a view to understanding what effect 
decoupled payments have on production. They reviewed earlier studies that showed that 
coupled direct payments had a negative influence on the participation in off-farm 
employment (Mishra & Goodwin, 1997). Ahearn et al.’s empirical analysis did not show any 
difference in the effect of direct payments, either coupled or decoupled, on the decision to 
participate in off-farm employment, but differing effects on the decision of how many hours 
to supply to off-farm work. They found no difference in the effect between payments that 
varied in their degree of ‘decoupledness’ on the marginal probability of working off the farm. 
But where farmers received decoupled payments for example, those payments resulted in 
farmers reducing their supply of off-farm work less than when they received coupled 
payments.  
Another study of interest is the one conducted by Keeney (2002). She modelled the time 
allocation decision of Irish farm households. Her study showed that coupled direct payments 
significantly affect the farmer and spouses’ labour allocation decisions. The results show that 
when a farm operator takes an off-farm job, he will increase the number of hours worked on 
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farm if significant coupled premia payments are present. She concluded that premia 
payments influence farm production and labour allocation decisions. Hennessy & Rehman 
(2007) modelled the effect of decoupled payments on the off-farm labour allocation decisions 
of Irish farmers. They suggested that decoupled payments could be viewed as a source of low 
risk non-labour income and they used the agricultural household model to examine the effect 
of non-labour income on off-farm labour supply. They concluded that the decoupling of 
direct payments was likely to increase the probability of off-farm employment and the 
amount of time allocated to off-farm employment.  
The majority of the studies reviewed have followed a similar approach. The labour allocation 
decision is examined in the context of the theoretical agricultural household model. 
Econometric participation models are developed where the decision to work off-farm is 
usually binary and in some cases determined jointly with the spouse’s decision in a bivariate 
probit framework. Once the probability of participation has been established, a labour supply 
model is usually developed to estimate the number of hours supplied by those who choose to 
participate in the off-farm employment market. Within this framework, the various factors 
that are hypothesised to influence labour allocation decisions can be tested. The following 
section of this paper describes the theoretical framework.  
3. The theoretical framework 
Becker (1965), in his seminal paper, assumed that households behave to maximise the 
household’s utility function defined over consumption commodities and that time is allocated 
between work and leisure so as to maximise that utility function. The allocation of farm 
labour can be modelled using an agricultural household model that integrates agricultural 
production, consumption and labour supply decisions into a single framework and operates 
to maximise Becker’s utility function. The agricultural household model developed by Singh, 
Squire & Strauss (1986) has been frequently applied to the study of labour allocation for 
example (Huffman & Lange, 1989; Gould & Saupe, 1989; and Weersink, Nicholson & 
Weerhewa, 1998).  
Here, we are specifically concerned with the labour allocation decisions of the farm operator 
and so a reduced form of the agricultural household model is used that only represents the 
decisions of the farm operator. Furthermore, the analysis here is simplified by ignoring many 
of the complexities of the model and extensions that have been developed, for example the 
interdependence of the labour allocation decision between spouse and operator, the utility of 
others in the household, commuting costs to off-farm jobs and household savings.  
If we consider the labour allocation decision from a farm operator’s perspective only, then we 
assume that the farm operator maximises his utility function, U which, drawing from Becker 
(1965), is assumed to be a function of consumption C and leisure time L, as expressed by 
equation 1.  
 Maximise U= f (C, L) (1) 
subject to  
 T= L + O + F  O≥0 (2) 
 C Pc= w O + (Pf Yf - If X f) + V  (3) 
 W= W (H,Z)  (4) 
 
Utility is maximised subject to time and budget constraints. The farmer’s total time 
endowment T is finite and is allocated between leisure (L), off-farm work (O) and farm work 
(F). It is normally assumed that time allocated to leisure and farm work is positive but for 
some individuals the time allocated to non-farm work may be zero, hence the inequality in 
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equation 2. Drawing from the neo-classical labour theory, the framework assumes that an 
individual maximises utility by choosing hours of farm labour, off-farm labour and leisure so 
that at the optimum, the marginal utilities of these hours are equal. Consumption goods, C, 
are the reward for labour and are purchased at price Pc. Total consumption is constrained by 
the budget constraint (equation 3) which states that consumption equals total income. 
Income is derived from the off-farm work wage, w by the hours worked off-farm O, the farm 
profit, that is price of farm goods produced Pf by the volume of production Yf less the cost of 
production, i.e. the cost of farm inputs If by the volume of output Yf and exogenous household 
wealth V; that is wealth that is not derived from farm or off-farm labour. The off-farm wage 
rate W that the farm operator faces is a function of H the farmer’s human capital and Z the 
local labour market conditions.1 The trade-off between time spent farming and time spent off 
the farm has been conceptualised diagrammatically by Sumner (1982) and is recreated in 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Diagrammatic representation of farm and non-farm work decisions 
 
Source: Based on Sumner (1982). 
The diagram presents the trade-off between time and income while U1 and U2 represent an 
individual’s indifference curves measuring their utility. U2 is preferred to U1 as more income 
can be earned for less work time and hence more time is available for leisure. The two curves 
Pf Yf and W measure the income returned to time worked in farming and off-farm 
employment, respectively. The point V on the income axis represents household wealth; that 
is income earned at zero hours worked. The marginal return to hours spent farming is 
measured by the slope of the Pf Yf curve, as can be seen the slope flattens as time increases, 
                                                        
1 The household model can also include a technology constraint on farm output to be a function of 
farm labour, human capital and farm specific factors. This is excluded in this reduced form of the 
agricultural household model presented here, as the interest of this research lies in the empirical 
evaluation of the effect of government subsidies on the allocation of farmers’ time and the interplay 
between farm and off-farm work.  
Work Time 
V 
Pf Yf 
U1 
T*F T**F T*O 
U2 
W 
Income 
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which implies that there are diminishing returns to hours spent farming. Slope W is linear; 
implying that the payment per hour worked off farm is constant, assuming a standard hourly 
wage. If there are no off-farm opportunities the optimal time spent farming is T**F; that is 
where the marginal returns to farming curve intersects the indifference curve. If off-farm 
work is available, the optimal time spent farming decreases to T*F, that is where the marginal 
returns to off-farm employment are equal those to farming. The optimal time spent working 
off-farm is equal to T*O - T*F. The option with off-farm employment is preferred as a higher 
indifference curve is achieved.  
The decision to participate in off-farm employment is binary. Rational individuals are 
expected to participate when the off-farm wage offered exceeds their reservation wage. This 
can be expressed as follows,  
 E[I¦X] = P(Oi = 1) = P(wr<wi) = ß’X  (5) 
where P(Oi = 1) is the probability of Oi = 1, that is participating in off-farm employment, 
which occurs if wr<wi, that is the reservation wage rate is less than the wage offered off-farm. 
The probability of participating in off-farm work is estimated using a vector of exogenous 
variables X that are hypothesised to influence the latent reservation wage and off-farm wage 
rates and therefore the participation decision. Variables that increase the off-farm wage rate 
relative to the reservation wage increase the probability of off-farm work and the opposite is 
true for variables that decrease the off-farm wage rate (Huffman, 1988). 
The supply function for off-farm work is determined by the optimal level of leisure hours and 
off-farm work hours, as described in equation 6.  
 O =T- L - F = f(wi, Pf , If, V, H, Z) (6) 
The number of hours supplied to off-farm work O is a function of the off-farm wage wi, farm 
profit, i.e. output less costs P f -, If, , exogenous household income V, the farm operator’s 
human capital H and local employment market conditions Z.  
4. The role of government subsidies in the theoretical model 
Economic theory suggests a number of avenues by which government subsidies may affect 
farmers’ labour allocation decisions: 1) by increasing the marginal value product of farm 
labour or increasing farm profit, 2) by increasing household wealth, V, 3) by reducing income 
variability or reducing farmers’ reliance on ‘risky’ revenue generated from the market. If a 
payment is coupled to production it will increase the marginal value of time spent farming 
but if it is decoupled it will not. A coupled payment requires that farmers produce a certain 
product to receive the subsidy and therefore it is equivalent to an increase in the farm wage 
rate; this is known as an income effect. Decoupled payments do not require production and 
therefore the introduction of a decoupled payment can be considered a source of non-labour 
income or exogenous household wealth that does not affect the marginal value of farm work. 
This is known as the wealth effect.  
Replacing coupled payments with decoupled payments is likely to affect the relative return to 
farm work. When payments were coupled to production in the EU, as they were throughout 
the 1990s and the early 2000s, the value of farm labour increased as the payments were 
included in the return to production and therefore the return to farm labour. When these 
payments were decoupled under the medium-term review (MTR) of the CAP in 2005, there 
are two distinct consequences. First the return to farm labour declines significantly as the 
payments are removed from the production-related profit, and second, direct payments form 
a new source of non-labour household wealth.  
The role of decoupled payments within the agricultural household model is interesting. As 
these payments are a source of household wealth, V, exogenous household wealth increases 
following decoupling. Burfisher & Hopkins (2003) suggest that decoupled payments impact 
on the farm household’s labour-leisure choice. If an individual receives an increase in non-
labour income, i.e. wealth, the household budget constraint is relaxed and, other things being 
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equal, the individual can work less and enjoy more leisure while maintaining consumption; 
that is a move to a higher indifference curve. On the other hand, decoupled payments are 
likely to change the relative returns to farm and off-farm labour. If the returns to farm labour 
decrease relative to non-farm labour, then the household model suggests that the individual 
will increase the number of hours allocated to off-farm labour, which is referred to as a 
substitution effect. Therefore, decoupling is likely to result in both a wealth and substitution 
effect, whichever effect is greater will determine the impact of decoupling on labour 
allocation. It is only by observing the behaviour of individuals that the two effects can be 
measured.  
A further extension of the agricultural household model hypothesises that the mean and 
variance of the variables specified in equation 6 also influence the allocation of farmers’ time. 
In other words, the variability of the farm wage, farm profit, output and input prices all affect 
a farmer’s decision to work off-farm. The theory is that farmers are risk averse and in order to 
reduce their exposure to income risk, farmers will allocate more time to less risky activities, 
for example waged off-farm employment. This theory is often cited as an explanatory factor 
for the increased incidence of off-farm employment (Barlett, 1991). Many studies have 
highlighted the effect of decoupled payments on farmers’ exposure to risk. Hennessy (1998) 
explored the interplay between decoupled payments, farmers’ risk preferences and 
production decisions. He concluded that if farmers display a declining absolute risk aversion 
preference, that is their aversion to risk declines as income increases, then an increase in 
wealth as a consequence of the decoupled payment can induce them to take riskier 
production decisions, and thus increase output and time spent farming, compared to the 
situation in which no decoupled payment is made. This finding can be extended to conclude 
that the reduction in farmers’ risk exposure as a result of the introduction of decoupled 
payments, known as the insurance effect, may result in farmers taking more risks and 
allocating less time to relatively ‘riskless’ off-farm employment. 
5. Conclusions 
The agricultural household model developed by Singh, Squire and Strauss can be used to 
explain the labour allocation decisions of farmers. As outlined in this paper, the model can 
also be extended to hypothesise how agricultural subsidies may affect the labour decision. 
The decoupling of direct payments has resulted in a reduction to the marginal value of farm 
labour that would lead one to believe that, other things being equal, utility-maximising 
farmers will allocate less time to farm labour and more time to off-farm labour, the so-called 
substitution effect. However, decoupling has also led to an increase in non-labour income, 
which means that farmers can allocate less time to labour and more time to leisure, while still 
maintaining consumption levels. This is known as the wealth effect. Subsequent work 
packages in this project will conduct empirical analyses to determine which one of these two 
effects dominates and hence provide some insight into the effect of agricultural policy on 
labour allocation decisions.  
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